Los Angeles , CA \\ August 10, 2012 at 7:25 pmsaid:
If loan was a sub-prime refinance, it was already in (false) default (with the GSE–i.e. Fannie/Freddie) before collection rights, therefore the securities were not valid mortgage-backed securities.
This is offered as brief, informational piece that is not to be held as legal guidance. herein are m observations or view that your undertaking a very difficult subject matter. One that that may or maynot be relevant to your case . I opine as an insider or industry professional with 25 years of experience.
First , please check where the securities offering your referencing is held under a broker dealer registration and specialty depositors accounts holding MBS offering’s sold to insitiuional investors . This class of securities was formed according to a private placement (i.e. perhaps a 506 D registration) criteria.
The tax payer corporation did in fact form a REIT and it’s subsidiary, a not-for-profit corpation is managed by the tax payer corporation, a Taxable REIT Subsidiary.
Are these deals above-board and valid? I believe so, I mean that sincerely. These structured financing deals are amongst bank and bank affiliated entities constructed on a classic purchase and sale-lease back deal structure as tax shelter schemes.For this purpose of creating dividends paid to preferred shareholders, the alleged servicing rights are fully disclosed in the PAS agreement. See where they are registered in each series (PPM) under the SEC guidelines which are in majority GAAP driven
If you’re talking about the ABS piece of the deal, then it’s the commercial line of credit that was capitalized into bond financing. The bond structure was sold to Barclays, DBS or HSBC as a negative pledge. This is the controversy, non yielding discounted bonds, used to platform the European side the “common into preferred” Dutch interest scheme; the US Banking flip side counterpart.
It was to access a spread of over 500 BPS at one point in time and there is the good will or overselling people talk about. What separates both and merges the two together is divestiture on the front end and recognition on the back. It’s done or was anticipated to be through a mergers and acquisition on the back-end . . . that never came to fruition
Embrace the deal structure and you realize they did everything legally, on the up and up, from a placement of the registration side of things.
It appears a sham offering, but never the less binding under the TRS formed subsidiary, LLC managed REIT.
If you embrace their deal structure and doors shall open for you les enfant
The assets placed into trust are the deals paid in capital. The paid in capital is accrued debt service owed by party “A” to Party “B” affiliate and managed subsidiary. Party “A” does the deal and series by a “purchase and sale” under a “Transfer and sale lease back” for the purpose of washing out the servicing rights into a future event, the M&A.
So the lease payments owed to the registrants share holders are for lease payments or other debt service to satisfy yield requirements for TPS holder. The payoff demand is to the yield requirements for the offshore enterprise accounts placed by foreign national investment firms.
We played our games with the commercial paper rates and they did the same with LIBOR as Barclays was caught.
It’s the “Bond” holder payment come due that is the heart of the controversy.
That amount is senor to the amount the FED is trying t recapture for UPB outstanding.
Now, the dilemma is the FDIC member bank never got to its point of destination – the M&A. The problem is IndyMac Bunk never merged with Lehman Bros Barnum and Bailout Circus . . . as the clowns were all fired by the FDIC. CWHL never merged with Bof A, Wachovia with GW, CitiFinancial, etc, etc
The problem is the talent who got them into the mess is preparing for their defense anticipating doing the prep walk here soon. The matter chatter is heightened by the fact the deal structure “basis in the assets” held in the indentures corpus is the sole basis of evaluating the deal and each transaction. It matters not that the Fed jumped in when they did. It’s problematic when the investor community is still spooked. In times like these Foo fighters and economist’s realize severe discrepancy in valuations exist for unknown reasons. In the cases I have seen, the note is one in the same with the title, and vice versa. Therein the estate or depositors account is valued in increments of $1,000 measured at 4:1 ratio of common stock to the household.
So Carrie – Assume they did everything right and agree there is nothing to fight for here, especially not in a government backed securities registration. Then you now can embrace their problems and not yours, you see –
So in a reversal, you’re left with 4 shares of stock for every $1,000 value in home price. This is the tender back into a right of foreclosure. Now let’s see what that stocks trading for at the moment….
$25.00 a share.
That’s $100.00 per $1,000 in home value. The barriers to foreclosure are a gap of 90% (credit bid) or $900.00 in the hole for every $1,000 in home value.
Here is where you begin to really upset a debt collector under SEC scrutiny for proper compliance in a highly monitored re-capitalization effort under a government sponsored tax payer guarantees
I personally tell attorneys not to get to heavy in the REAL ESTATE arguments as the legal title is the support for the failed valuations requirements needed to foreclose. It seems to me this is not what a Homeowner bargained for. . . legality set aside !
Testimony in Civil & Criminal, Bank related Securities and Mortgage Lending matters