Thousands of trusts based on a similar mortgage assets were created to sell bonds to investors, and some trusts carried private mortgage insurance. Most of the trusts used to fuel the subprime debt debacle and commercial cross collateralized mortgages into pools were filled with residential mortgage loans as well as other types of loans and commercial paper used as collateral.
Roughly a third of the US financial markets were financed by the non-bank sector, which has largely disappeared. Violations of securities law weigh heavily upon the regulatory requirements for investor protections while consumer settlement and practices compliance fails as do the adherence to a variety of technical securities registration rules and laws.
The conclusions are presented in testimony with every effort necessary to simplify the complexities for understanding culpability and interst in assets of the parties while maintaining an honest an honest assessment of all facts. In this controversy it is especially relevant to point out the putative terms causal to support for relevant claims versus obvious “garden variety “ causes that normally fall under RESPA and TILA Federal disclosures.
I contend that long term involvement in the securitization process, from 1994 through to 2001 is essential for sharing the proper understanding of the claims brought in this matter. Testimony should be specific offering special knowledge, where skill, experience, training, and education personally known to me provide ample familiarity for claims based on arguments brught by counsel.
In a Reuters 2011 article is discussed the 1925 pre-depression financial isues that mirror our poblems today. Supreme Court Justice Brandeis, the progressive Justice of the Supreme Court, set the high road for the law concerning the assignment of all collateral, from commercial receivables to mortgage notes. The critical commentary by the justice is held in the decisionin Benedict v. Ratner as follows: But it is [268 U.S. 353, 363] not true that the rule stated above and invoked by the receiver is either based upon or delimited by the doctrine of ostensible ownership. It rests not upon seeming ownership because of possession retained, but upon a lack of ownership because of dominion reserved. It does not raise a presumption of fraud. It imputes fraud conclusively because of the reservation of dominion inconsistent with the effective disposition of title and creation of a lien.
When one reads the Brandeis decision it is apparent how the justices take on the current problems facing the foreclosing parties today where the decision attack the practice of making a simple, common law pledge of receivables. Claims held by the creditor of a defunct company over which Benedict was the receiver, were rejected by Brandeis. The 1927 decision rocked the landscape of American finance. This is alleged to have began a seven-decade long debate over the proper construction of secured financial transactions. The decision was responsible for the adoption of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which governs the methods used to create most commercial security interests in collateral.
In my earnest opinion, this case bears many of the familiar requisites for an aged old dilemma that is the assignment of collateral is deficient without “the effective disposition of title and creation of a lien.”
The subject claims in a foreclosure defense are for mortgages used in financial transactions involving a security that lacks the features that transfer the legal interst in title. If not, this “imputes a lender can blow hot and cold at moments notice and bring to any jurisdicition its claims while hoping to receive a common law sympathetic decision to a forelosure defense .
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