Private deeds.

It is to be observed that this note is confined to cases involving substitute conveyances which of themselves purport to convey the title, and does not include decisions dealing merely with instruments of confirmation which contain no granting clauses, but merely in terms confirm former conveyance. For discussion of the analogous question as to alteration of deeds after delivery, see the note to Waldron v. Waller, 32 L.R.A. l.V.S.) 284.
 Requisites and effect generally 
ato deeds pendente lite, see infra, V.
The substance, and not the form, is-the material thing in ratifying instrument; and where the deed is voidable merely, it is not necessary that the ratifying instrument observe all the formalities required of the deed, such as, for instance, attesting witnesses, so long as the instrument is sufficiently full and formal to show distinct purpose on the part of the grantor to treat the former deed as his act and abide by it. Hadden v. Lamed, 87 Ga. 634, 13 S. E. 806. In tliis case, wife, who had conveyed property to her husband unsuccessfully attacked the deed upon the ground that at the timeof its execution she was nan compos mentis? and sought in this way to defeat levy of execution upon the land to satisfy demand against tho husband.
Where title is vested by delivery of * deed to the grantee, it can be devested only by deed, signed and sealed by the grantee, and not by tho mere handing back of the deed; and new deed in such circumstances,, from the grantor to the grantee, passes, nothing. Mead v. Pinyard, 154 U. S. 620, 23 L. ed. 501, 14 Sup. Ct Rep. 1205. (Generally as to effect of destruction, cancelation, or redelivery to grantor of delivered but unrecorded deed, see note to Matheson v. Matheson, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1167.)
So, where deed which has been lost isconfirmed by second deed executed for the express purpose of taking the place of the first deed, and reciting that it is of the same tenor, the second deed is merely confirmatory and of itself conveys no title, and therefore it is not contradicted or enlarged by evidence that language in the two deeds was identical. Scalpen v. Blanchard, 1ST Mass. 73, 72 N. E. 346.
deed which is made avowedly for the purpose of curing defects in previous conveyance, and which recites such conveyance andprobability that it was ineffectual, and that it is the consideration of the subsequent conveyance, will be held operative as aconfirmation or as deed of bargain, and sale, and effect will be given to it according to the intention of the parties. Fauntleroy v. Dunn, 3 B. Mon. 594.
And correction deed prevails over the deed corrected in respect of the boundaries^ of the land conveyed. Builders Mortg. Co. v. Berkowitz, 134 App. Div. 136, 118 N. Y. Supp. 804.
No United States revenue stamps, under statute requiring stamp on all deeds conveying land or other realty “sold,” are required upon deed executed after the revenue act went into effect, for the purpose of correcting an imperfect description and confirming the grant in deed executed before the revenue act went into effect

Foreclosure Newsworthy Forum

California Attorney General Kamala Harris reportedly sent subpoenas to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, requesting information about their servicing, foreclosure, and property leasing actions in the state. The attorney general’s office also intends to investigate the GSEs’ actions regarding purchases of “toxic mortgages.” With one of the highest default rates in the nation.
The notion of a State agency or department suing a Federal Agency is somewhat discouraged by the current administration . The government has issued a variety of notices asking federal agencies to stay out of this toxic mess now being brought to the judicious by the state.
California Attorney General Harris has been actively seeking aid for California homeowners and has recently lobbied for increased principal reductions from Fannie and Freddie.These lender foreclosures are affirmed to be “cyber” recoveries that are recapturing the value of the realty upon charges taken against assets held in trust as bare and legal title.
According to expert Maher Soliman , the Nevada  Attorney may find it difficult to prosecute criminal charges against title officers for alleged Robo-signing. The defendants are employed by Lender Processing Services (LPS) and are allegedly responsible for tens of thousands of fraudulent documents that made their way through the Clark County Recorder’s Office from 2005 to 2008.  LPS says it cooperated with Masto’s investigation and was assured earlier in the month that the company was not a target of the attorney general’s inquiry. What is puzzling here is the Robo Signatures allegations are precedence over support case law that reveals UCC 3-606 as an equitable doctrine which was designed to protect the surety’s right of subrogation.
The test for unjustifiable impairment of collateral not in the creditor’s possession is whether the creditor exercised reasonable care considering the circumstances of the case. The burden of proof is on the party claiming the defense, and he must prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. Bank of Ripley v. Sadler, 671 SW2d 454 (1984). See Annot., “What Constitutes Unjustifiable Impairment of Collateral, Discharging Parties to Negotiable Instrument, Under UCC 3-606 (1) (b)?” 95 ALR 3d 962 (1979).
Failure to execute a security agreement in the collateral constitutes an impairment of collateral. White v. Household Fin., 302 NE2d 828 (1973); North Bank v. Circle Investment Co., 432 NE2d 1004 (1982). See also Hurt v. Citizens Trust Co., 128 Ga. App. 224 (196 SE2d 349) (1973); First Guaranty Bank v. Szekeres, 139 Ga. App. 124 (227 SE2d 908) (1976),
For this purpose the law holds that “impairs” means injured, allowed to deteriorate in value, or that the creditor was negligent in failing to foreclose prior to the bankruptcy of the debtor. Depending on jurisdiction, the court can decide the matter recognizing a  burden of proof   on the guarantor or accommodation party to show impairment of the collateral. Mitchell v. Ringson, 169 Ga. App. 88 (311 SE2d 516) (1983).